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Healthcare
by Terri K. Benton*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article offers a review of recent healthcare law developments in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The cases
discussed below span topics from disclosure of protected health
information under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA),1 arbitration agreements and their interplay in
wrongful death suits, and the reduction of medical care provided through
the Georgia Pediatric Program (GAPP).'
II. DISCLOSURE OF PROTECTED HEATH INFORMATION UNDER HIPAA
In Opis Management Resources, LLC v. Secretary FloridaAgency for
Health Care Administration,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit focused on whether Florida Statutes § 400.145,' which
allowed a nursing home to release medical records of a deceased resident
to certain specified individuals, was preempted by HIPAA.' As general
practice, the nursing homes in Florida "received requests from spouses
and attorneys-in-fact for the medical records of deceased nursing home
residents." The nursing homes denied these requests because the
parties did not meet the requirements of a personal representative under
HIPAA.' "Consequently, the requesting parties filed complaints with
* General Counsel for The Reunion Group, LLC, Macon, Georgia. Albany State
University (B.A., 2009); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2012).
Member, Mercer Law Review (2010-2012). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
2. See infra note 57.
3. 713 F.3d 1291 (2013).
4. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 400.145 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014), invalidatedby Opis Mgmt. Res.
LLC v. Sec'y Fla. Agency for Health Care Admin., 713 F.3d 1291 (2013).
5. Opis Mgmt. Res. LLC, 713 F.3d at 1293.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil
Rights, which concluded the [nursing homes'] actions were consistent
with HIPAA."' However, the defendant-appellant, Florida Agency for
Health Care Administration (the Agency), issued citations to the nursing
homes for violating Florida law by refusing to grant the requests of the
spouses or attorneys-in-facts of the deceased residents.9 The Agency
interpreted § 400.145 to mean that a spouse qualifies as a personal
representative under HIPAA, and so a deceased resident's medical
records may be disclosed to the resident's spouse.o
Due to the conflicting interpretations of the same statute, the nursing
homes filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida seeking a declaratory judgment that
§ 400.145 is preempted by HIPAA. After reviewing the parties' motions
for summary judgment, the district court decided that HIPAA preempted
§ 400.145 because the statute afforded nursing home residents less
protection than required by HIPAA."
The Agency appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. 2 The court of appeals reviewed the district court's
grant of the nursing homes' motion for summary judgment under de
novo review, viewing all the evidence and drawing all reasonable
inferences in light most favorable to the nursing homes." On appeal,
the Agency argued that the district court erred in granting the nursing
homes'motion for summary judgment because § 400.145 does not impede
the goals and purposes of HIPAA. Further, § 400.145 fulfills a vital
requirement of HIPAA by defining the category of personal representatives that may receive a deceased individual's protected health information."

In its analysis of the Agency's position, the court of appeals reviewed
the preemption doctrine and stated that when state law conflicts with
federal law, the federal law controls.'" Moreover, in HIPAA, there is
an expressed preemption clause that further expresses Congress's intent
for HIPAA to preempt state law.'" Congress drafted HIPAA to protect
the confidentiality of patients' health information, and Congress

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In
specifically outlined the disclosures permitted under HIPAA.
regards to deceased individuals, "[ilf under applicable law an executor,
administrator, or other person has authority to act on behalf of a
deceased individual or of the individual's estate, a [nursing home] must
treat such person as a personal representative under [HIPAA], with
respect to protected health information relevant to such personal
representation."" Further,

a [nursing home] may disclose to a family member, or [other relatives,
close personal friends of the individual, or any other persons identified
by the individual] who were involved in the individual's care or
payment for health care prior to the individual's death, protected
health information of the individual that is relevant to such person's
involvement, unless doing so is inconsistent with any prior expressed
preference of the individual that is known to the [nursing home]. 19
The main point of the Agency's argument against preemption was that
any person who has authority to act on behalf of the deceased person
should be treated as a personal representative."o However, "the plain
language of § 400.145 does not empower or require an individual to act
on behalf of a deceased" person.2 1 Thus, the statute permits disclosures
to individuals without regard to whether the individuals have authority
to act on the deceased resident's behalf.22 The court of appeals
"agree[d] with the district court that § 400.145 frustrates the federal
objective of limiting disclosures of protected health information, and that
the statute is thus preempted by the more stringent privacy protections
of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule."
In further analysis of the Agency's arguments the court of appeals
stated that the Agency's argument, that section 164.510(b)(5), of
volume 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) saves Florida
Statutes § 400.145, faces the same problem as discussed above.2
"While § 164.510(b)(5) authorizes [nursing homes] to release a deceased
individual's protected health information to family members or other
individuals, the regulation does not open a broad new avenue of access

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. at 1295 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(4) (2013)).
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(5) (Supp. 2013)).
Id. at 1296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(5) (Supp. 2013).
Opis Mgmt. Res. LLC, 713 F.3d at 1296.
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to protected health information, as the [Agency] contends." 26 Instead,
45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(5) permits nursing homes to release protected
health information in only certain circumstances.2 ' First, the request
for protected health information must be submitted by those involved in
a deceased resident's health care and those who paid for a deceased
resident's health care.28 Then, a nursing home may only disclose
information that is relevant to such person's involvement.2 ' Florida
Statutes § 400.145 does not address the impact of HIPAA and is not
carefully tailored to permit only those individuals who have a HIPAAcompliant authorization to receive the protected health information of
the deceased residents.o Therefore, § 400.145 is preempted by HIPAA,
and the court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment."
III.

ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND WRONGFUL DEATH SUITS

Next, in Hogsett v. Parkwood Nursing & RehabilitationCenter,Inc.,32
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
decided whether an arbitration agreement was binding when a nursing
home resident's daughter signed the agreement without any legal
authority to do so." In review of the relevant facts, a mother had the
lower part of her leg amputated and was admitted to a nursing and
rehabilitation center to recover. The daughter of the prospective
resident completed the intake paperwork for her mother, including an
arbitration agreement. The mother did not sign any of the intake
paperwork, was not present at the time her daughter completed the
intake paperwork, and had not given her daughter the authority to
complete the intake paperwork. Further, both the daughter and
Parkwood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc. (Parkwood) agreed that
the daughter did not have any legal status that would authorize the
daughter to complete the paperwork on behalf of her mother.'
Following the mother's admittance to Parkwood, the staff did not
adhere to the plan of care for the mother, and her amputation became
severely infected. As a result, the mother's condition quickly deteriorat-

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1298.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30016 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
Id. at *28.
Id. at *2-3, *5-6.
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ed, and she died fifteen days after being admitted to Parkwood. The
resident's husband and daughter brought claims against Parkwood in
their individual capacities, and the daughter brought claims against
Parkwood in her capacity as the representative of her mother's estate.
The claims on behalf of the estate were dismissed.35
In response to the daughter's and husband's claims, Parkwood filed a
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims and to compel arbitration on the
said claims "based on the arbitration agreement signed by [the
daughter]."
In deciding whether to grant Parkwood's motion to
dismiss, the district court analyzed whether the arbitration agreement
was binding on the estate, despite the estate's claims being dismissed,
because "if the decedent . . . agreed to arbitrate any claims against

defendants, then presumably her survivors on a wrongful death claim
would be bound by that agreement as a wrongful death claim would be
derivative of the medical malpractice claim that the decedent could have
made."'
While analyzing the arbitration agreement, the court stated that the
agreement required consent by the parties to the agreement.38 Both
parties agreed the daughter signed the agreement when her mother was
admitted to Parkwood. However, the plaintiffs argued that the daughter
did not have the authority to bind her mother to the arbitration
agreement because the daughter did not have power of attorney over her
mother. Further, the daughter stated that her mother did not give her
permission to sign the arbitration agreement on her mother's behalf.
Parkwood did not offer any evidence that the mother was incapable of
making decisions for herself at the time the mother was admitted to
Parkwood. Parkwood argued that despite the absence of expressed
authority, the daughter had implied authority to sign the arbitration
agreement as her mother did not protest her daughter signing the
agreement or her admittance to Parkwood."
In order for implied authority to exist, the mother must have given
some indication that she agreed to be represented by her daughter."o
Under the present set of circumstances, the district court held that the
mother never made any statements that would lead Parkwood to believe
that her daughter had any authority to sign the arbitration agree-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13-14.
Id. at *16.
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ment.41 Moreover, Parkwood could not have inferred that the daughter
had any sort of implied authority based on the circumstances.4 2 Even
if the mother knew that her daughter signed the admissions documents
prior to her arrival to Parkwood, the mother could not have known that
an arbitration agreement was included in the admissions documents and
could not have assented to her daughter's signature of that agreement. 43
In regards to mental or physical incompetence, if a patient is
incompetent, "an adult child, among others, may consent for treatment
for her parent."
However, Parkwood did not provide any evidence
that the mother was mentally or physically incompetent to sign the
admissions documents, including the arbitration agreement. 45 Furthermore, Georgia case law states that unless a patient's representative has
a general power of attorney over the patient, the representative cannot
bind the patient to an arbitration agreement signed prior to the patient's
admittance to a nursing facility.46 Parkwood failed to address the
Georgia case law that was in direct opposition to its position that the
daughter had implied authority over her mother.47 Thus, because there
was no binding arbitration agreement, the husband's wrongful death
claim was not subject to the agreement.
Analysis of whether the daughter's individual claims were barred by
the arbitration agreement was more difficult to decide because there was
no precedent on that issue.49 Equitable principles fail to support a
daughter not being bound by an arbitration agreement that she
signed.o However, the agreement was never between the daughter and
Parkwood, but between the mother and Parkwood." The district court
side-stepped the issue of whether the daughter was bound by the
arbitration agreement by noting that the daughter was not the proper
party to bring a wrongful death claim.52 The mother's husband had

41. Id. at *17.
42. Id. at *18-19.
43. Id. at *18.
44. Id. at *20.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *23 (citing Life Care Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 298 Ga. App. 739, 743, 681 S.E.2d
182, 186 (2009); Ashburn Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Poole, 286 Ga. App. 24, 27, 648 S.E.2d
430, 433 (2007)).
47. Id. at *26.
48. Id.
49. See id. at *28.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at *29.

2014]1

HEALTH CARE

10 33

standing to bring a wrongful death claim, and he was not bound by the
arbitration agreement." Therefore, Parkwood's motions to dismiss or
compel arbitration was denied, and the plaintiffs were ordered "to file an
amended complaint setting out their existing claims."
Following both Opis Management Resources, LLC and Hogsett, the
implication for plaintiffs is that an agreement executed by someone
without the legal authority to act on behalf of a deceased patient may be
rendered void." Thus, a plaintiff may be able to recover damages even
after the plantiff knowingly signed an agreement waiving any right to
said damages." For defendants, Opis Management Resources, LLC is
a reminder that nursing or rehabilitation facilities must ensure that any
person executing an agreement on behalf of a patient has the proper
legal authority to act on behalf of that patient." By failing to verify
that an individual who is executing a document or requesting protected
health information has the legal authority to do so, nursing or rehabilitation facilities leave themselves open to unnecessary liability.
IV.

THE REDUCTION OF MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED THROUGH THE
GEORGIA PEDIATRIC PROGRAM

In Hunter v. Cook," another case in the United States District Court
of the Northern District of Georgia, the court decided whether Georgia's
Department of Community Health (DCH) was permitted to reduce the
number of hours of care that a doctor recommends for a child to receive
through the GAPP.5 "Under the Medicaid Act, Georgia is required to
provide certain categories of care to eligible children, including early and
periodic screening, [and] diagnostic and treatment services [EPSDT."o
This mandate is carried out by the DCH through GAPP." Through
GAPP, the child receives private-duty nursing services from either "a
registered nurse or nurse practitioner under the direction of the [child's]

53. Id. at *26, *30.
54. Id. at *31-32.
55. See OpisMgmt. Res. LLC, 713 F.3d at 1297; Hogsett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30016,
at *22.

56. Hogsett, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30016, at *26-27.
57. Opis Mgmt. Res. LLC, 713 F.3d at 1296.
58. Hunter ex rel. Lynah v. Cook, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72110, at *1-2 (N.D. Ga.
2013).
59. Id. As part of the Georgia Medicaid system, the Georgia Pediatrict Program
(GAPP) provides services for medically fragile children as an alternative to institutionalization. See FACT SHEET: THE GEORGIA PEDIATRIC PROGRAM (GAPP), dch.georgia.gov/sites/
dch.georgia.gov/files/gappfy14_final.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
60. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72110, at *1-2; see also O.C.G.A. § 42-2-142 (2013).
61. Id.
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physician at either the (child's] home, a hospital, or a skilled nursing
facility."62
The plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that they did not receive
sufficient hours of private-duty nursing services because the defendant
did not approve "their requests for private duty nursing services based
on physician recommendations."63 The plaintiffs later amended their
complaint to include "claims for violations of the Medicaid Act and its
EPSDT provisions, violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA], and violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."" The defendant moved for a "partial summary judgment
arguing that all of the Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed with the
exception of those claims related to the number of skilled nursing hours
which are medically necessary for the Plaintiffs to correct or ameliorate
their medical conditions."6
The defendant based its motion for summary judgment on several
grounds.66 The defendant argued
that (1) the Plaintiffs have not identified the services they have been
deprived of under the Georgia Medicaid Program; (2) the Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that the Defendant fails to inform them of the
scope of services available under the EPSDT; (3) the Plaintiffs have not
shown that the Defendant denies or reduces services based on a
Plaintiff's specific illness or condition; (4) the Plaintiffs have not shown
that the Defendant applies the wrong standard to requests for nursing
services; (5) the Plaintiffs have not shown that the Defendant violated
the law by reducing services based on a Plaintiff's relative stability; (6)
the Plaintiffs have not shown they have been denied medically
necessary services; (7) the Plaintiffs have not shown that the Defendant denies private duty skilled nursing services on the basis of cost;
and (8) the Plaintiffs have not shown that they have been denied
transport with a nurse to doctor appointments.
Further, the defendant argued that it had not violated the plaintiffs'
rights under the Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or ADA. 6"
In its analysis of the plaintiffs' claims under the Medicaid Act, the
district court examined whether: (1) the defendant provided all medically
necessary services; (2) the defendant informed the plaintiffs of the scope
62. Id. at *2.
63. Id. at *2-3.
64. Id. at *3; see also U.S. CONsT. art. V; U.S. CONsT. art. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012);
42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2012).
65. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72110, at *4.
66. Id. at *5.
67. Id. at *5-6 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at *6-7.
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of services available under EPSDT; (3) the defendant denied or reduced
services based on the plaintiffs' illnesses or conditions; (4) the defendant
applied the proper standard to requests for nursing services; (5) the
defendant denied services because the plaintiffs' condition had not
deteriorated enough; (6) the plaintiffs were provided with medically
necessary services; (7) the defendant denied services based on cost; and
(8) the defendant provided for a nurse to travel to doctor appointments.69
First, the plaintiffs did not allege in their complaint that they were
deprived of medically necessary services, case management services,
personal care services, and incontinence supplies.o Therefore, the
defendant's partial motion for summary judgment was granted with an
exception for the plaintiffs' claim that they were not receiving the
medically necessary number of private-duty nursing hours from the
defendant, which was deemed a question for a factfinder.n
Second, the plaintiffs did not provide evidence or case law supporting
their contention that confusion with the DCH website is a violation of
the requirement to inform EPSDT participants." Thus, the defendant's
motion for summary judgment was granted on this ground."
Third, the plaintiff did not establish that the defendant reduced or
denied services based on specific illnesses or conditions." Therefore,
the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on that
ground.75
Fourth, the plaintiffs did not set forth any evidence to support their
allegation that the defendant did not adhere to the medically necessary
standard as required by the Medicaid Act when evaluating requests for
private-duty nursing.76 However, there was a question of fact regarding whether the defendant followed the medically necessary standard
when deciding to limit the plaintiffs' private-duty nursing service
hours."
Fifth, plaintiffs' claims "based on whether the Defendant [reduced]
services based on the relative stability of a patient's conditions" were
unfound and, therefore, were dismissed." However, a question of fact

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at *7-9, *11-16.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *10-11.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13.
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existed "with respect to whether the Defendant .
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.

. provid[ed] the

plaintiffs with the medically necessary level of private duty nursing
services.""
Sixth, the court stated that "the fact that the hours of private duty
nursing services provided by the Defendant" may decrease from the
number of hours recommended by the physician does not mean that the
defendant "has not provided all medically necessary treatment."80
Thus, there is a question of fact with respect to the number of hours that
are medically necessary for the plaintiffs' care.e"
Seventh, the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the defendant
denied services based on cost." Thus, the defendant's motion for
summary judgment was granted on this point.'
Eighth, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on
the issue of providing a nurse to travel to doctor appointments because
the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence showing that the defendant
denied such requests.'
Next, the plaintiffs argued that the threat of institutionalization is
cognizable under the ADA.' The court stated that "lblecause there is
a question of fact ... whether the reductions in private duty nursing
hours were in accordance with the . . . medically necessary treatment,

there is an issue of fact to whether the plaintiffs face a threat of
premature institutionalization.'
Thus, summary judgment was
denied on this issue.
Finally, in regard to the plaintiffs' claims under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiffs did not provide evidence that the
boilerplate language in the denial of coverage letters indicated arbitrary
and capricious decision-making." Therefore, the defendant's motion for
summary judgment was granted with respect to the plaintiffs' Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims." As there remain issues left to be
decided at the district court level in Cook,90 its implications are not yet
known. However, entities providing medical services under the GAPP

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at *14.
Id.
Id. at *16.
Id.
Id. at *16-17.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *20.
Id.
Id. at *20-21.
Id. at *22.
Id. at *1.
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should ensure that any reduction in medical services is based on
verifiable evidence that the services are not needed. By having an
articulable reason for reducing medical services, entities providing
medical services under the GAPP would have an argument against
liability alleged by those who received a reduction in medical services.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit did not have many noteworthy cases during
2013. The main points discussed in these cases were that the administrative portion of nursing or rehabilitation facilities and entities
providing medical services under the GAPP must ensure that the legal
status of individuals is known prior to releasing protected information
and allowing individuals to execute documents on a patient's behalf.
Further, medical services offered under the GAPP should not be reduced
unless there is a verifiable, articulable reason for reducing such services.

